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A~STRACT

This paper consid ers the cost to society of long-ru n reducti ons
of aggreg ate energy input from its equilib rium level.

A heuris tic

d
partia l equilib rium model reveals the econom ics behind the results obtaine
froru partia l equilib rium simula tion models .

This partia l equilib rium

approac h provide s a previou sly unrecog nized upper bound on the social
cost of conser vation in an otherw ise undisto rted economy.

The net

social cost attrihu tahle directl y to conser vation, rather than to the

re,
aggrav ation of existin g distort ions such as a non-op timal tax structu
is likely to be much less than the cost of the energy saved.

THL COST OF AGGREGATE ENERGY CONSERVATION
Brian D. Wright
Yale University

Within the past decade there has been a dramatic increase of
interest in proposals to reduce aggregate energy consumption below the
level implied by an unrestricted domestic market.

Recent destabiliz

ing events in the Middle East have made these proposals more urgent.

If they are to be intelligently evaluated, it is essential that their
costs and benefits to society be appropriately estimated and inter
preted.
The benefits of conservation include improved national security
through greater energy independence.

1

In this paper I take these

benefits as given, and evaluate the cost to society of aggregate
energy conservation, defined as the reduction of national energy use
below its equilibrium level at the overseas-determined import price,
by means of taxes, quantitative measures, and/or moral suasion.
import price is assumed constant;

The

as is emphasised below, the domestic

social cost of an OPEC price increase is much greater than the cost of
an equivalent domestic tax.

Further, conservation is envisaged here

as a long-run, gradual process; embargoes and other short-run distur
bances are not considered.
This question has already been addressed by a number of energy model
ing studies.

Those that allow for the crucial substitution responses

which economists expect to occur all agree that conceivable long-run re
ductions of energy inputs will have a much less than proportional affect
on GNP.

In this paper I show that a very simple heuristic model can

adequately reproduce the estimate of the cost of aggregate energy con
servation produced by more complex models, as long as the overall capital-
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energy substitution elasticity implicit in the latter is known.

This

simple model clarifies the economic relationships which underlie the
partial equilibrium response.
A large segment of the population, including many well-informed
members of the business community, apparently is afraid that conservation
will be much more costly than predicted in these models.

One reason why

the modeling results are not more widely accepted is that -energy modelers
and model analysts have themselves raised seYeral serious questions con
cerning their validity as a guide to real-world decisions.
Almost all the energy mo<lels talre a partial equilihrium approach,
an<l several evaluative and interpretive studies have expressed concern
that the n~latively small impact of energy conservation on GNP derived
from partial equilibrium models might not he a good indicator of the
cost of the full general equilihrium response (Rogan and Manne, 1Q77;
Modeling ~esource Group, 197R: Hogan, 1Q77).
this Question

The common belief that

hinges on the suhstitutahilit y or complementarity of

capital and energy is 11 ttle comfort, since the latter is also the suh
_iect of vigorous nehate.

(See Berndt an<l Wood, 107°).

Others have also

argued that real-world market distortions, such as taxes, might greatly
increase the general equilibrium cost of energy conservation (Sweeney,

107R).
To address these prohlems, I present a general equilibrium extension
of the heuristic partial equilihrium analysis, and show that the partial
equJlihrium iiesponse to conservation can be interpreted as a constrained
general equilibrium response.

Thus the nartial equilihrium cost estimate

is an outer bound on the general equilibrium social cost, if the economy
is otherwise unciistorted.

Any claiT'l that partial-equilih rium models of this type

-3understate the real costs of restricting energy consumption must he hase~
on the argument that energv-prir.e increases aggravate existing distortions
such as non-optimal factor taxes.
The paper is organi?:ed as follows.

In Section l the heuristic pnrtial

equilihrium analysis is developed t_o show how the qualitative results of
modern partial equilihrium simulation models can he interpreted in
terms of simple and familiar aggregate economic responses. As a prelude
to the analysis of the general equilihrium implications of the partial
eqnilihrium results, Section 7 contains a critical niscussion of the
criteria which must he met if a model is to he capable of predicting
the full general equilibrium implications of an aggregate energy reduction.

In Section 3 the general equilibrium effect of energy conservation

on natural product is compared with its partial equilibrium counterpart.
Previous attempts to derive simple hounds on or predict the direction of
the general equilihrium response. hased on the characteristics of the
production function, are shown to represent at hest special (and rather
unJikPly) cases.

Thus the issue of capitaJ-energv coy,,pleMentarity is

placed in proper perspective.

The general equilibrium welfare cost in

an undistorted economy is considered in Section b, and thf' implications
of other economic distortions are considered in Section 5.
are summarized in the closing i:;ection.

The conclusions
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1.

The Cost of Aggregate Energy Conservation in Partial Equilibrium
In analyzing the effects of energy taxation or regulation, a common

approach is to concentrate on modeling the energy sector in considerable
detail, using energy demand and input supply relations to represent the
connections between this sector and the rest of the economy.

This partial

equilibrium approach assumes that these relations are independent of the
changes in policy under consideration.
Interpretation of the results of such models is hindered by two
serious difficulties.

The first is that since each model incorporates

a great number of technical and economic assumptions, it is not always
possible for those not intimately familiar with the models to know whether
differences in outputs are due to differences in assumptions and exogenous
inputs, or to differences in internal structure.

Great progress has been

made in attacking this problem in a recent research project for the
Modeling Resq~rce·Group, chaired by Tjalling Koopmans, of the National
Academy of Sciences CONAES study (MRG 1978) which used input from experts

.

to define a standard set of key assumptions which were then adopted in
simulations of the DESOM model of Brookhaven National Laboratories (Marcuse
et al., 1975), the Nordhaus model (Nordhaus, 1Q73, 1976), and the ETA
model (Manne, 1976).

This approach has been extended by the Energy Modeling

Forum at Stanford to study a wider set of partial and general equilibrium
models, as discussed further below.

2

These standardized simulations have helped in identifying the
parameters which are most important in determining the cost of conservation (MRG, 1978, pp. 46, 106-115; EMF, 1977, Vol. 1, pp. 19-26, Vol.
2, Appendix D).

Working with a simpler heuristic model Hogan and Manne

(1977) have confirmed the insight that the elasticity of substitution
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and the extent of change in energy use are the major determinants of
the economic cost of aggregate energy conservation in these partial equi
librium models.

All the above studies agree that the relationship is

nonlinear, small cutbacks being associated with disproportionately low
economic cost.

Figure 1 is a typical illustration of this relationship.

In each of the above works this relationship is derived from
the numerical results of model simulations.

The underlying economic

relationships are neither identified nor explained.

Thus a second major

problem, the lack of attention to the analytical relationships involved,
remains.

It is reflected in recent evaluations of the conditions under

which partial equilibrium results are valid or even useful indicators
of the general equilibrium response, as is shown below.
To demonstrate the simple and basically familiar economic relation
ships which determine the cost of modifying aggregate energy use, I will
now outline a heuristic partial equilibrium approach which adequately
(for our purposes) reproduces the cost of aggregate conservation derived
from more ambitious partial equilibrium simulation models.

This approach

is based on the following model which will later be used to show the re
lationship between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium estimates
of this cost.
Consider an economy where the final output is a single good

Y

which is produced by the only domestic primary resource and by energy.
The total domestic primary resource endowment is normalized to unity.
Of this a fraction
to the production of

N

(for non-energy resource) is used as an input
Y.

Though primary domestic resources include in

practice at least capital and labor, for simplicity only one domestic
primary resource is considered here.

Energy Eis initially assumed tobe

(NP)
(NP)

1
0

1.00

B

0.98

A

0.96

0.94

o. 92-

o. 90-

0

El
----.....
-------.------,.------,-------------1
--.5
Eo
.6
.7
.8
.9
1.0

FIGURE 1
The Relation between Energy Use and National Product
Source:

Curve AB illustrates the results of simulation of the Nordhaus
model under increasingl y severe constraints on aggregate energy
use. These results are also presented in Table 2 below.

-7-

entirely purchased from a stock held by foreign oil producers ("OPEC")
in exchange for Y.

'l'he economy is a price-taker with regard to E.

More

E

specifically, any amount is available at a constant price P , denominated
0
in units of Y, which is the numeraire.
The production function is:

Y

(1)

=

F(N,E), FN _:: 0,

F > 0
E-

and unless otherwise stated it is assumed to have constant returns to
scale.

In this one-period model, saving is ruled out.

Therefore con

sumption of final product in this model equals Net National Product (NNP),
which, since depreciation is also assumed away, equals GNP, or simply
National Product (NP):

(2)

Social welfare is measured by the utility of anyone in the population
whic is assumed to be composed of identical individuals.

Questions of

income distribution are thus avoided
(3)

The initial competitive equilibrium is equivalent to that achieved

by maximization of the social welfare function
straints (1) and (2).

(4)

U , subject to the con

The Lagrangian is:

LC U(l-N, C) - A(C - y + P~E) - µ(Y - F(N,E))

The first order conditions are equations (1), (2) and
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(5)

PE =

(6)

au
ac - UC =

(7)

au
aN - UN

(8)

).

~F

). E

0

=

µ

).

= -µF

N

.

Since the importing country is assumed to be a price-taker:

(9)

Now let us examine the partial equilibrium effects of a reduction (dE)
of the energy input from its initial equilibrium value.

The assumption

which identifies this exercise as a partial rather than a general
equilibrium approach is that the aggregate input of
fixed at

(10)

N , . the
0

N

=

level of

N

N

is assumed

at the initial equilibrium:

N
0

Taking a second-order approximation to (2) about the initial equilibrium,
using (1), (9) and (10):

(11)

From (5) and (8)

(12)

From (11) and (12):

(13)

d(NP)

Energy
Price

- - - --

--------i- -.D

I

I

'

I

Energy Input
(Btu)

0

FIGURE 2
The Effects of an Energy Input Reduction
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This estimate of the change in national product is illustrated in Figure
2 as the area
MP ,

of the triangle Fen under the marginal product curve,

for a reduction of E from E 0 to_ E1 •

the area E BcE •

Area E ncE

1
purchases at the price P~.
0

1

the area Br.n.

0

The change in Y is given by

represents resources saved by reducing oil

The difference, the change in C, is given by

If FEE is calculated at N0 , equation (13) approximate s

area Rr.n as area Fen.
If the change in energy consumption were a response to an OPEC
E

price rise to

pl,

then the change in

C would also include the in-

crease in the cost of the energy units purchased at the new price, which
is represented by area

In the case considered here the area

represents domestic revenue from the tax on

E,

which we assume is

redistribute d as a lump sum payment to consumers so that this area repre
sents no net cost to the economy.

Hence the welfare effects of moderate

conservatio n forced on the economy by direct OPEC action are much more
serious than the effects of an equivalent curtailment of imports through
domestic taxes, as long as the revenues from the latter are put to socially
desirable use.

To characteriz e the latter case as a self-impose d embargo,

as some prominent economists have done, is to court confusion of the
very different welfare implication s of the two cases.
Now is the net cost of energy conservatio n, represented by the
area

BCD,

a large or a small burden for the economy to bear?

After

the OPEC embargo of 1973, many claims were made, at least partly on the
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s, that the cost
basis of casua l infere nces drawn from histo rical trend
n would he a
of a given perce ntage chang e in natio nal energ y consu mptio
rough ly equiv alent perce ntage fall in GNP.

In this sense growt h in ~p

rule of thumb ,
was said to be "coup led" to growt h in energ y use. This
3
this analy tical
still curre nt in busin ess circl es, can be evalu ated using
model .

simul ations
For finite chang es in E in the range consi dered in model

chang e in Natio nal
the follow ing appro ximat ion measu res the propo rtiona l
Produ ct and consu mptio n in respo nse to a chang e in E:
6~~P)
(14)

(flP)

befor e an~ after
where bar super scrip ts denot e avera ges of the value s
Thus the propo rtiona l respo nse of natio nal

conse rvatio n.

produ ct is

¢ , the elast icity of margi nal produ ct with

half the produ ct of

of energ y in
respe ct to the quant ity of energ y used, the value share
tion.
GNP, and the squar e of the propo rtial energ y input reduc

Reade rs

elast icity of
might wonde r why I expre ss this relati on in terms of the
icity of deriv ed
margi nal produ ct of energ y rathe r than using the elast
demand for energ y, to which it is inver sely relate d.
that since

¢

The reason is

is determ ined solely by the produ ction techn ology it

both the
has a straig htfor ward defin ition which is consi stent with
used in this
parti al and the gener al equil ibrium model ing frame works
paper .
e 1 above ,
The graph of this expre ssion gives a figur e like Figur
which has been deriv ed nume ricall y in other studi es.
C with respe ct to energ y use is

6<;_/~E .,
(15)

c/

E

1
2

-

EF

E

C

6E
F,

The elast icity of

-l?-

Since the mean domestic value share of energy,

EF/C,

is likely to be less

than n.1, this elasticity is very low unless the ahsolute value of~
and/or of the (positive or negative) energy change from E0 is large.
Clearly the one-to-one ''coupling" of. proportional changes in energy and
GNP is repudiated, for accepted parameter values, by this analysis.

In

fact the elasticity is generally so low that I propose the following rule
of thumb measure of the cost of moderate energy conservation which has
greater intuitive appeal.

The ratio of the net cost of conservation to

the cost of the energy saved is approximately.
(16)

dr.
F~(l;;n,Nn)dE

The ratio given by equation (16) is an approximation to the ratio of
It has unitary elasticity

the area Ben to area DcE 0E in Figure 2.
1

with respect to$ and with respect to the proportional change in E
(see Figure 1).

1¢1

Hy this rule of thumb rf, for example, ~E/E 0 = -Q.l,

must exceed 10 hefore the estimated net economic cost exceeds half
4

the value of the energy input conserved.·
an

On the other hand, if¢= 2,

energy tax which produced a ten percent long-run cutback in total

energy consumption from an uncUstorted equilibrium would by this rule
have a net cost to the economy equal to about 10 percent of the resource
cost of the energy saved.
The isoquant map presented in Figure 4 illustrates the adjustment
which prevents a one-to-one coupling of the percentage changes in ~ational
Product and in energy use in this model.

In Figure 4 N is held at N0 ,

its original level, as Eis reduced from E0 to F 1 , reducing the maximum
level of output from Y0 to Y •
1

This reduction is the equivalent of the

-n -

Cha nge in NP

Cos t of Ene rgy Sav ed

<f>

-E

6E

•

-10 .

-0· 5

FIGURE 3
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'Non-ene rgy

Input

N

0

0

E

0

Figure 4

Energy Input

-i-5-

area RCE 0E in Figure 2.
1

The direct effect of a reduction in E (which

is a reduction in Y from Y to Y ) is, in this partial equilibrium model
0
2
with N held fixed, mitigated by an increase in the ratio of~ to E
(which increases Y from Y to Y ), ~hich we might more comfortably
2
1
call "substitution" of N for E in production if that particular tt::nn
had not become such a source of confusion in the literature.
in

Only

the limiting case of Leontief technology illustrated in Figure 5

(and reflected in certain energy models such as at least the early ver
sions of the PI~OT model (Parikh, 1977)) is this change in factor
ratios incapahle of reducing the impact of an energy input reduction.
r.iven constant returns to scale, Figure 5 depicts one-to-one coupling
of energy and GNP in this partial equilihrium model.
Thus far we have considered only the case where all energy E
comes from an overseas supplier, "OPF:r.."

But in most countries a

large proportion of energy is produced domestically.

We can easily

extend the simple model developed above to handle domestic energy if
we accept two radical simplifying assumptions:
(1)

All energy is a homogeneous product.

(2)

Each type of energy production uses as input only

Y and

perhaps some limited natural resource (such as oil deposits,
coal beds, river flow, etc.).
Given these assumptions, and assuming finite amounts of energy
are available at constant cost from each source (as in progra1ll1J'ling models),
a partial equilibrium energy market projection for, say, the year 2010
can be illustrated by Figure 6.
curve.

Segment JC

5

The solid line

AK

is the energy supply

represents imported oil, and segment

GH

represents

nuclear energy.

The cost of a cutback in imported oil to reduce total

energy from

to

E
0

E
1

is represented by the area of triangle

BCD.
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y

y
2

Non- ener gy

0

Inpu t

-- -- --

N

0

A

y
0

I
y

2

l
I
I

0

/

I

/

I

I
I

I
I

l

!

El

E

0

FIGURE 5

Ener gy Inpu t
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PE

1

PE

0

PE

N

-~·

----,-F

-A

J

K

I
H I

I

I
I
I

I

I

MP

I
I

I

I
I

El

FIGURE 6

EO

Energy Input

-18If, instead , this ·cutbac k represe nts elimin ation of nuclea r energy,
the rectang le

FJHG

must be added to the total cost.

rent on the lost nuclea r capaci ty.

The more nearly margin al is nuclea r,

then (by definit ion) the smaller is the differe nce
area

It is the foregon e

and the

FJGH ..
In genera l, area

BCD

plus any change in rents measur es the

cost of any energy conserv ation policie s.

This is the one-se ctor

analogu e of the cost estimat ed by the partial equilib rium models for
each year of the foreca st interva l.

As stresse d above, this analogy

rests on a number of simplif ying assump tions.

Do these assump tions cause

the heuris tic model to fail in its task of represe nting the major econom
ic
respon ses involve d in partia l equilib rium studies of energy conserv ation?
This questio n would be difficu lt to answer in detail in the contex t
of
this paper.

But it is easy to show that the heuris tic model does ade

quately reprodu ce the cost of modera te levels of conserv ation predict
ed us
ing the Nordhau s model, a complex partia l equilib rium program ming model
which gives estima tes of the cost of aggreg ate energy conserv ation which
are qualita tively similar to those of other major energy models which
allow for substit ution in produc tion.6
The MRG study presen ts the results for the year 2010 of simula tions
of the Nordha us model for increas ingly severe constra ints on aggreg ate
energy consum ption (MRG, 1978, pp. 112-113 . The origin al modelin g exercis
e
is reporte d in Nordha us, November 1976).

The energy demand elastic ity re

ported for the Nordha us model for year 2010 at base case prices and
quanti ties
(MRG, 1978, p. ·210, Table C.3) is interpr eted in the followi ng exercis
e as the
inverse of the arc elastic ity of margin al produc t

~

over the range of change .

The results of the heuris tic model using this elastic ity, are
compar ed with those of the ~ordhau s model in Table 1.

They are simila r up to sub-

TABLE 1
Partial Equilibrium Estimates of the Cost
of Conservation in Year 2010
Energy Consumption Changes*

Nordhaus Model*

Heuristic Model**

[~:]

ti(NP)
(NP)
0

ti(NP)
(NP)
0

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.107

0.000

0.000

-0.249

-0.004

-0.004

-0.369

-0.011

-0.011

-0.469 (zero growth
from 1975)

-0.023

-0.023

*The energy consumption changes and the Nordhaus income changes are
calculated directly from MRG (1978), Table 111.24.
~*This column is calculated using equation (14). The arc elasticity
4, is approximated by the inverse of the "elasticity of demand" of
-n.4Q derived from the Nordhaus model for year 2010 base case prices
and quantities, as presented in MRG (lg78), Table C.3, p. 210. The
share of primary energy in GNP in the base case, year 2010, is calcu
lated from information in MRG (1978), p. 70, Table 111.10 p. 89, Table
111.17, p. 90, Table 111.18 and the additional assumption that the
price of oil, NGL and gas is the-same per Btu. EF. is calculated using
c
~ , ~E/E and the base case share of primary energy in GNP discussed
innnediately ai:>ove.
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stantial reductions in energy use. (Indeed the accuracy of approXl,Jlla
tion might ordinarily be somewhat lower for other similar exercises.) This
comparison is consistent with the propositions that changes in rents are
a relatively minor component of the cost of economically rational measures
to achieve moderate energy cutbacks, and that once the aggregate estimate of

~

has been determined the more complex multisectoral structure necessary to answer
the detailed questions which these models must address is not essential
for estimating the cost of economically rational aggregate energy con7
servation.
The relative simplicity of this heuristic model makes it a valuable
tool in examining the conditions under which the partial equilibrium
modeling approach is both valid and useful.

In the model evaluation

literature there is a common implication that the partial equilibrium
approaches are valid only if energy-economy "feedback" is acceptably
small.

For example, Hogan and Manne (1977, p. 260) state that "If the

substitution effects are significant, the feedback effect on the evaluation
of the energy system is relatively small.
tor may be analyzed by itself.

In this case, the energy sec

The changes in energy utilization and

economic costs can be represented adequately by the first order effects
contained in traditional microeconomic demand curve analyses."
How significant is general equilibrium feedback?

8

Does it render

partial equilibrium estimates of the cost of energy alternatives completely
useless?

Or can the partial equilibrium approach still yield helpful

indicators of the social cost of alternative energy policies?

These

important questions have been studied by energy modelers in recent years.

Unfortu nately, the analytic al models used in these
studies do not apply the necessar y general equilibr ium constra ints, as
discusse d below.

These question s are addresse d in the followin g section s,

where the heurist ic
part.

1110del is compared to its general equilibr ium co~nter 

But first it is necessar y to conside r further what we mean hy

"genera l equilibr ium" feedhack , since the current terminol ogy is imprecis e
and confusin g.

In the next section I discuss the links between energy

use, primary factor supplies and aggrega te demand which transmi t the
general equilihr ium response s which partial equilibr ium models must ignore.
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2.

The Energy-Economy Feedb ack in Gener al Equil ibrium Model
s
The econo mic flows in the gener al equili brium count erpar
t of the

model we have been consi derin g are illust rated in Figur
e7.

House holds

may now alter their suppl y of facto r

N (and consu mptio n of 1 - N )
0
in respo nse to chang es in energ y used in produ ction.
Such a "feed back"

respo nse will affec t outpu t

Y and consu mptio n

affec t the consu mer's alloc ation of

N.

If

C,

which will in turn

N is labor (capi tal), the

respo nse affec ts the labor -leisu re (cons umpti on-sa ving)
decis ion.
new equil ibrium , the value o~

N must equal the value of

At the

C to consu mers.

In parti al equil ibrium mode ls, one must choos e betwe en
holdin g

N const ant

and obaer ving the chang e in the value of C (the appro
ach taken above ), or

holdi ng

C

const ant and obser ving the chang e in

N.

In this paper , the consi stenc y betwe en the value of input
s and
the value of marke ted outpu t

( N and

C respe ctive ly) is viewe d as a

neces sary featu re of a gener al equil ibrium model .

Witho ut it, infere nces

regar ding the effec ts of "gene ral equili brium feedb ack"
betwe en energ y and
prima ry facto r input s can be serio usly misgu ided, as
is shown below .
Thoug h this point might appea r obvio us in this stark model
depic ted in
Figur e 7, most of the model s commonly referr ed to as
gener al equili brium
energ y model s do not conne ct this link.
For examp le, the orif!i nal ~u"'so n-Jorg eniJon , (1974 )
inter -indu stry

model took the price s of prima ry input s (capi tal and
labor ), and aggre gate
deman d, from their separ ate macro econo mic growt h model
, but there was
no feedb ack link from the inter- indus try model to the
growt h model ; the
growt h path was exoge nous.

There fore the simul ations of aggre gate energ y

conse rvatio n via a Btu tax are analog ous to simul ations
of a multi secto ral
versi on of the parti al equil ibrium model prese nted above
, modif ied so that
doaea tic energ y produ ction is taken into accou nt. 9
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HOUSEHOLDS
(Consume 1-N , C)

Fac tor Sup ply N

Fina l Prod uct
Con sum ption C

/

'

Fac tor Inpu t

N

PRODUCERS
Fac tor Inpu t
.

E

>

I

I
Ener yy

'

E

Y

Outp ut

I

OPEC

I

'

Payment
Y-C

FIGURE 7
Equ ilibr ium Model
Econ omic Flow s in the Sim ple Gen eral
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Alan Manne's ETA-MACRO is a model "designed to estimate the extent
of two-way linkage between the energy sector and the balance of the U.S.
economy" (Manne, 1977, p. 1).

It is constructed by linking the ETA model

(Manne, 1976) with a simple macroeconom ic growth model which incorporate s
an innovative putty-clay distinction between "old" (1970 and prior vin
tages) and "new" capital stocks.

It is difficult to assess this model

since the MACRO sub-model is not fully documented in available publication s.
But the aggregate primary capital and lahor resource constraints do not
appear to be imposed on the energy model.

If this is true, the general

equilibrium relationship s between energy availablili ty, aggregate demand,
and consumers' allocations of their primary resource endowments, which
complete the "two-way linkages between energy and the rest of the economy"
10
(Manne, 1077, p. 1) are mis-specifie d in the model.
Reister and Edmonds (1977, p. 199) characteriz e their model as
a "two-sector general equilibrium energy demand model," but in their
view "general equilibrium means that there are strong interaction s be
tween the two sectors of the model."

Since their model treats the price

of capital, the price of labor and the supply of labor as exogenous
(p. 212) it cannot be used to study the general equilibrium energy
economy relationshi ps in which we are interested.
In fact the only energy models currently availahle to this author
which clearly meet the criteria necessary to characteriz e

them as complete

general equilibrium models are the Hudson-Jorg enson LITM (Hudson and Jor
genson, 1977) and models derived from or otherwise closely related to it.
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(e.g. }lnyilicza. 1976).

The relationship between energy cost estimates

produced by such general equilibrium models and the results of partial
equilibrium 1110dels is examined in the next section, hy comparing the solu
tion using the heuristic partial equilibrium model with its general
equilibrium counterpart.
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3.

The Effect of Conservation on Economic Activity in General Equilibrium
Using the definition of general equilibrium applied above, the general

equilibrium counterpart of the parti.al equilibrium cost of conservation in
the heuristic model developed in this paper emerges when the constraint given by (lC
is relaxed.

For small changes in E, the change in consumption is approximated

by substituting (1) in (2) and totally differentiating:

(17)

ar,

=

FEdE + FNdN - P~dF.

Using (12),
(18)

dr. = F d'l
N

The change in C is directly related to the change in N.
(18) ls t~e sign of d~,

(19)

The sign of

which is obcained from differentiation of

(12):

FEE dE
F

NE

For small reductions in Ethe sign of d'l and dC is opposite
to the sign of F!-TE"

If F is linear homogeneous F1-rn

is positive and a small

amount of conservation reduces r; indirectly through (18) by inducing
a reduction in the supply of N.
Second-order effects are ignored in (17). (18) and (1~).

Since

they were crucial in the partial equilibrium result, I now extend
model to include them.

the

Taking a second-order approximation to (2),

using (1) and (9),

If the second-order terms are non-negligible, the signs of the
changes in r, and~ are indeterminate in the absence of further restrictions
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Two alternative cases are illustrated
n
In both figures TT is the initial social indifference

on the model, even if FNF. is known.
in Figures Rand Q.

curve before conservation.

TP(N,

F.

0 ) is the

total product curve for input

of N (increasing from right to left) .given the original input of E, ~ .
0

Total

product at an input of ~O (and consumption 1 - N 0 increasing from left to
right) is (C 0 + P~~) units of Y.
of Nin units of r..

The slope of the radius OR 0 is the price

Consumption of final product,

c0 ,

equals the earnings

of N~ units of domestic primary resource used in production.
reduced to E , the total product curve falls to TP(N, E1 ).
1

When

F,

is

If~ is held

constant at N , consumption of final product, C, decreases by the fall
0
in output Y net of the saving in expenditures on E.

r. 0

-

This fall in consumption,

r. , measures the cost of the energy cutback which is approximated in
1

equation (13).

If the two-factor production function has -constant returns to
scale, FNB

~

O, so that the marginal product FN(N 0 , F. ) is lower than
1

FN(N , B ). This negative effect on the marginal value of N0 as an
0
0
input in production would, ceteris paribus, increase consumption by
households of this domestic primary resource (1 - N ), and reduce its
0
use in production.

But if N is a normal good, this effect will be

opposed by the income effect of energy conservation, which increases the
supply of~ offered in the market.

The general equilibrium response

is the net result of these two effects.
In Figure 8, where the income effect on the supply of N is outweighed
by the decline in marginal productivity, the new equilibrium point F
is associated with a decrease in the absolute value of N (an increase
in consumption of the primary resource from (1 - N0 ) to (1 - N1 )) and

tion
Consumpl Product
of Fina
C

Ro,

(units

Uo

\_

Input of

·---------

0

Domestic
Primary Resource

.

E E

~. -P 0

FIGURE 8

o

0

Consumption o
Final Product
C

0

u1 u

-- - -- .,_

N

Input 1-0
of Domestic
Primary Resource

Figure q

a decrease in C to

<\.

'But in Figure

the decline in marginal productivity.
increased to N .
1

Q,

thP income effect outweighs

At the new equilibrium F, N has

If FNE > 0, and N is a normal good, the new equilibrium

must lie to theright of the income consumption curve through B, IB.

In

this case if r, is inferior in the relevant range, the new equilibrium
could be associated with an increase in C; otherwise C falls as in Figures
8 and

Q.

If FNE > 0 and '1 is inferior in the relevant range, it is easy

to confirm that rand N hoth fall.

(See Figure 11 below).

If F

'lE

<

n,

the sign of the change in '1 is ambiguous regardless of the income elasticities.
The above cases indicate that a wide variety of responses to energy con
servation is possihle even in a two-factor model.
Four of the possible general equilibrium responses of input 'l
and output Y to an energy input curtailment are illustrated in factor
factor space in Figure 10 by points A, R, C and n.
response is represented hy point P.

The partial equilibrium

Even if both N and Care normal goods

and F~E is positive, only point A is ruled out as an equilibrium response.
The conclusion that the general equilibrium response of national
product to energy conservation can differ greatly from the partial equilib
rium response in either a positive or negative direction is none too
comforting for partial equilibrium modelers.

Several studies attempting

to reduce this ambiguity have proposed simple rules which attempt to relate
the sign of the difference hetween the partial and general equilibrium
effects on national product to a single specific parameter of the model,
or calculate bounds on the general equilibrium response using partial
equi1ihrium approaches.

The heuristic model developed and illustrated

above is useful in evaluati.iag these rules, which include the following:
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1)

Until recently, a prevalent view was that the substitutabilit y

or complementarity of energy with labor or capital in production, measured
by the sign of the Allen partial elasticity of substitution in production,
determined the direction of change of equilibrium primary inputs in response

_,u

·.

to a change in energy use. But in the simple two-factor model with negative
elasticity of substitution in production,

I have shown that conservation

might induce an increase or a decrease in the use of the domestic primary
resource, depending upon the characteristics of the complete model. 12
2)

Hogan and Manne (1977, p. 273) have posited that in a three

factor-model with two primary domestic resources (Kand L) if Lis held
constant at its initial level the response which maintains the marginal
product of K represents a lower hound on the input of that resource and
an upper bound on the effect of a change in energy supply on output.
This general proposition can be examined in the model used here.
The model with fixed labor is equivalent to the two factor model used
here, where the production function F has decreasing returns, and N is
understood to represent the capital input.

It is then possible

that

f
)
> E _13
F~E < O; and that FN ( E ,N ) > FN,E
0 ,_N 0 where E0
1 0
1 . In this case,

if the response to conservation is to maintnin the marginal product of
~, it must involve an increase in~ which moderates the fall in E.
Output would he higher in this case than if N were held fixed an ~ ,
0
given E • · Thus the case where the marginal product of the variable
1
factor is constant clearly does not give a general lower bound on
the change in: primary resource input or in output, in response to a
change in

E,.

..

If as is in ~eneral more likelv F~TI": > 0, then capital

must be an inferior good if its marginal product is to remain constant,

as is shown below.

Even if this is true, the conditions do not constitute

a bound on the response of capital or national product.
3)

In a re-examination of this issue, Hogan (1977) argues that

"the likely relationship between capital and energy is one of aggregate
complementarity.

Restrictions on energy use should induce reductions in

the demand for capital and, therefore, exacerbate the economic impacts
This general conclusion is base.cl on the same

of energy policy" (p. 24).

assumptions as the earlier Hogan-Manne conclusions, namely constant mar
ginal productivity of capital which is justified as ''most plausible" by

14

a rather circular rationale, and exogenous labor supply.

Under these

assumptions Hogan (p. 21) claims that the necessary and sufficient con
dition for a reduction in energy to cause a negative response in capital
(complementarity) is, in the notation used here, FNE

>

0.

In the heuristic model developed here, the condition of constant
F~, means that the new equilibrium point must lie on the income consump
tion curve IB through the initial equilibrium point Bin Figures 8, 9, and

11.

In Figures 8 and 9 the new equilibrium point F does not lie on IB.

In fact if FNE > 0 F can lie on IB only if the income elasticity of con
sumption of the domestic primary resource, (1-~), is negative in the
relevant range, that is, the domestic primary resource is an inferior good
as illustrated in Figure 11.

This is hardly the most plausible situation.

It is true that if we consider only first-order effects of conservation,
equations (18) and (19) above

confirm Hogan's insight that the capital

response to conservation has the sign of (-FNE).

But, as is shown below,

this assumption is equivalent to assuming that energy conservation has no
effect on welfare, and hence no income effect.
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It is possible to consider the effects of energy conservatio n in an
intertempor al context by reinterpreti ng Figures 8, 9 and 11 as representing
a simple two-period Fisherian m,del.

Capital is assumed to be putty-putty ~

for our purposes this is a non-crucial simplificat ion.

N units of capital

are committed in period 1 to production in period 2, reducing consumption
in period 1 from its maximum level of unity,

which is the endowment

given by the sum of current income plus past net accumulatio n,
The price of "OPF.r." energy remains exogenous.

to (1-~ ).
0

If labor supply is fixed,

consumption C in period 2 is given by equation (2).

Under this redefinition

of the variables, TP (N, E0 ) represents the intertempor al opportunity locus
given that E is held at its free market level E-0 • If energy input is re
duced to t hy, for example, a redistribute d tax, then the locus becomes
1
TP (N, E ).
1

Table 2 summarizes the implication s of energy conservatio n by shc,wing
the effects of the general equilibrium primary resource input response in
this simple Fisherian
of parameters.

model, for cases representing six possible combination s

In case 1, which is the most plausible, and in two others,

the .sign of the general equilibrium response of the domestic primary resource
~. and its effect on National Product, is indetermina te.

In case 1, if

it is positive, it is less than the negative direct effect of the energy
reduction.

Case 5 is the only case which is consistent with the conclusions

of Hogan (1Q77).

15

Though Table?. shows that the difference between the general equilib
rium and partial equilibrium effects of energy conservatio n on National
Product is 1n ·general indetermina te, the same is not true for the effects
on social welfare in an otherwise undistorted economy, as is shown in the
next section.

1'A1'LE 2

The Response to Energy Input r.onservation in the , Two-Period Ffsherian Model

r:hange in
Inv,..stment

Income Elasticity of nemand for
.

.

- ..

;

..

Case

r.urrent r.on8umption
(1 - N)

Future Consumption
C

Nl - NO

FNF,

Change in
National
Product

cl - r.o

Net

Effect of General
Equilibrium Investment Response on

Change in

Social*
Welfare

.

NationaJ
Product

Social Welfare

'I

1

>

n

>

n

>

n

?

-

?

+

-

2

:,. n

>

n

< 0

+

?

+

+

-

'3

> n

<

n

> n

?

?

?

+

-

4

> 0

<

n

< 0

+

?

+

+

-

5

<

n

> (}

> 0

-

-

-

+

-

6

< 0

> 0

< (}

?

?

?

+

-

'

*It is assumed that at the initial equilibrium there are no market distortions.

I

w

Q'\

I
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4.

The Wel fare Cost of Con serv ation :

Gen eral Equ ilibr ium vs. Part ial

Equ ilibr ium
The gene ral equi libri um effe cts of ener gy
cons erva tion inclu de not
only the chan ge in Nati onal Prod uct, as in
the part ial equi libri um mod el,
but also the indu ced chan ge in allo cati on
of the dom estic prim ary reso urce
endo wme nt. In gene ral equi libri um we can
no long er use the chan ge in
Nati onal Prod uct, C, as the sole indi cato
r of the chan ge in welf are.
Take a seco nd orde r appr oxim ation to (3)
at the init ial equi libri um:
( '1)

From (6), (7) and (8):
(22) •U~

+

UlN = 0

niff eren tiati ng (22) and solv ing for UN'l:
(23}

dC
uNN - - uCCFN -d~

-

u'-'"

"'-.T

dC

.n..T
•n

-

uCN FN - uCFNN -

tJ

F

dE

C NE dN

Sub stitu ting in turn (Z3) , (20) and (6) in
(21) elim inat ing high er-o rder
term s,
(24)

dU •}.

1
-

[ 2

F

EE

(dE)

2

1

+ - F
2

-

NE

ctr:
d~dE • 4-ciF
2 E

The gene ral equi libri um "we lfare trian gle"
, like the part ial
equi libri um cost measure give n in (13) abov
e, cont ains no firs t-or der
term s. The firs t-or der appr oxim ation s (18)
and (19) abov e invo lve no
net welf are cost , sinc e the chan ge :fn r, is
comp ensa ted hy a chan ge in
the allo cati on of N.
Now, is the welf are cost repr esen ted in (24)
grea ter or less than
its part ial equi libri um coun terp art, ~>.F
EE(d E)'? One easy way to answ er
this ques tion is to poin t out that afte r
the ener gy cutb ack, assu ming no
othe r mark et dist orti ons , the part ial equi
libri um solu tion can he deri ved
from the Lagr angi an

-:rn(25)

L • ll(l-N, C) - ~(C - Y+PE"F:) - u(Y
- F(N, E))
~
·
- w("'• - "')
'o
0

- Y(,,.Ll - E·o ) ·

The relRxation of the restriction on N given hy equation (lO)must lead
to a non-negativ e welfare change in this perfectly competitive economy,
though the net welfare effect of conservation clearly remains negative.
These effects, which are reported in Table 2, can be illustrated
using Figure 8, in which the input of N decreases.
equilihrium point F, the fall in national product (r.

At the unconstrain ed
0

-

c1)

is greater

than predicted in the partial equilibrium case (Cn - C?.), but the effect
on welfare is mitigated hy an increase in consumption of the domesticres ource. 16
1
The net. general equilibrium welfare change is Un - U.

we measure the changes positively here.)

(For convenience

This change can be represented

in consumption units by aggregate-ec onomy equivalents of familiar partial
equilibrium surplus measures (Hicks, 1044), which can be illustrated using
Figures 8, o and/or 11.

The Marshallian surplus measure for the change

in welfare due to conservatio n holding Nat N is (c - r. ). This is a
0
0
1
lowP-r hound on the Hicksian equivalent variation, the vertical displace1
ment of TP(N, E ) necessary to allow it to touch U.
0

The Hicksian compen-

sating variation, the minimum offsetting change in C needed to justify
energy conservatio n,

is the vertical displacemen t of TP(~, E ) necessary
1
n
to allow it to touch lJ. (Cn - C?) is obviously an upper bound on this

compensatin g measure.
change in r., (r.

0

-

Hence the absolute value of the partial equilihrium

r.?), is an upper bound on the Marshallian surplus, and

also on the compensatin g variation, which is an appropriate welfare cost
17
measure in this case.
The general equilibrium response reduces the social
cost of conservatio n, as shown in Table 2.
This useful interpretati on of the partial equilibrium results as an
upper hound on the welfare cost of conservatio n in an otherwise undistorted
competitive economy clearly extends to the multi-facto r case.
been recognized in the energy modeling literature.

It has not

5.

The Implications of Pre-Existing Market Distortions
The conclusions of Section 4 were derived assuming that the

economy is subject to no market distortions other than the energy con
servation measures themselves.

If o·ther distortions exist, do they affect

the conclusion that the partial equilibrium cost is an upper hound on the
wclf~re cost of conservation, measured by the compensating variation?
The answer is that they do.

If, for example, there is a positive distortionary

tax on Ton N, which is redistributed to the consumer, equation (22) becomes

TT.N + U·c (FN - T) = 0

(26)

Differentiating (26) and solving for U

NN

(27)

.

u.;n
_. ...... - -

UCCFN ddNC - UCN

~.c,. -

u"

UCNF..., :

:.

uCF NN

-

uCF NE

d~

d~

+ uCCT

dC
~

+ u~ 'T'-

Substituting in turn (27), (20), and (6) in (21), and eliminating
higher-order terms,

Since the last two terms are negative, the existing distortion increases
the welfare cost relative to the cost in (24) above, if dN is negative.

In

this case the partial equilibrium estimdte of the welfare cost is not un
equivocally an upper bound on the general equilibrium estimate.

(Since the

supply of N_ (consumption of 1-N) is already distorted hy the tax, the restric
tion N • ~O imposed by the partial equilibrium approach does not necessarily
reduce welfare, as was argued above for the case of an initially undistorted
market.)

'l.fore generally, if conservation aggravates an existing distortion,

the welfare loss is greater, but if it reduces an existing distortion of
moves N toward its undistorted level) the cost is lower.

N (i.e.

The principal market distortion recognized in the modeling liter
ature is the tax-induced divergence of the private from the social rate

of return on capital ('MRG, 1978, p. 27; Manne, 1Q77, pp. 18-lQ; EMF, 1977,
Vol. 2, p. F-7; Sweeney, 1978, p. 37).

But the mere existence of such a

divergence does not imply that the welfare measure (13) is no longer
valid.

In an intertemporal framework an optimal tax structure under a

revenue constraint might include taxes on both capital and labor, depending
on the specification of the intertemporal utility function. 18 If the tax
on capital is one element of a set of optimal taxes, it can be shown that
the second order effects in formula (24) comprise the appropriate estimate
of the welfare change, if conservation is achieved by measures that produce
zero net revenue.

If conservation produces tax revenue, the cost will

actually be even lower assuming the rest of the tax structure is optimized.
Even if the tax structure is non-optimal, would it be desirable to
recognize this fact in a general equilibrium calculation of the cost of
energy conservation?

The answer depends upon one's view of the rigidity of

the constraints on other means of tax reform.

Certainly if th€ cost

of

conservation attributable to the non-optimality of the fiscal structure
is included in calculating the costs of energy conservation, then to the
extent that this tax structure effect is important the energy problem is a
fiscal problem rather than a technological and behavioral problem.

For

this effect represents "tbe additional costs of maintaining a sub-optimal
tax structure subsequent to conserving energy" rather than "costs of energy
conservation."

If the initial equilibrium is modeled to include optimal

taxes, partial equilibttum estimates place a useful upper hound on this
latter cost~

If the (distorted) general equilibrium cost estimate is higher,

s0111e of the attention given to the energy problem should be diverted to the
problem of general tax refom.

19
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Conclusions
The net welfare cost of long-run reductions in aggregate energy
input of up _to one half of its equilibrium level is likely to be less
20
(and perhaps much less) than the cost of the energy input foregone.

This rule of thumb, which is consistent with the results of a number of
large-scale energy models, is derived from a simple heuristic partial
equilibrium model that illustrates the major economic relationship s
preventing the one-to-one "coupling" of percentage reductic,ns in energy
and national product.

If the elasticity of marginal product of energy

is known, the more accurate measure of the cost of conservation given
by equation (14) above adequately duplicates the results of more complex
partial equilibrium energy models.
Up to now, questions about the general equilibrium implication s of
such partial equilibrium results have limited their credibility .

These

misgivings are largely attributabl e to confusion over the definition of
full general equilibrium linkages, which is also reflected in the structure
of some "general equilibrium " energy models.
A general equilibrium extension of the heuristic partial equilibrium
model shows that, if the economy is initially undistorted , the partial
equilibrium cost estimate is an upper bound to the general equilibrium
welfare cost.

On the other hand, the general equilibrium effect of energy

conservatio n on national product is more difficult to determine from the
results of partial equilibrium analysis.

Rules proposed on the recent

lite~ature to.predict the direction of, or place bounds on, the general
equilibrium response of national product, using measures of the substitu
tability or complement arity of energy with capital such as the Allen elas
ticities or the second partial derivatives of the production function,
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are at best valid only in (rather unlikely) special cases.
If other economic distortions are present, then the welfare
· implications of the partial equilibrium analysis are less straight
forward.

But to avoid overstating this difficulty, two points must

be emphasized.

First, taxes should he considered distortionary only

to the extent that they deviate from their optimal levels.

Second,

the effect of these distortions on the welfare cost of energy con
servation should be interpreted as an indicator of the extent to which
tax reform might help us solve the energy problem.
These conclusions have been derived in an idealized model with
only two primary factors and one final product.

Thus we have ignored

suhstitution between different energy products in production and con
sumption, and between energy and non-energy products in consumption,
in discussing the economic cost of energy conservation.

However, the

extension of the competitive model to a more realistic intertemporal
world with interindustry transactions and multiple energy products should
confirm the most general implication of this paper.

It is that if we

can control other economic distortions, the cost of aggregate energy
conservation estimated by partial equilibrium energy models is an upper
hound on the true social cost, if the model parameters are accurately
estimated.

Energy modelers can in this sense afford to be more confident

that the social cost of long-run energy conservation is at least as low
as most of their models make it appear to be.
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1 Note that if energy consumers bore the full cost of their marginal
contribution to insecurity, this rationale for public intervention would
not exist. Another benefit of conservation might be a dampening effect
on OPEC price increases. However the argument below assumes that energy
import price is exogenous.
2

·volume 1 of the 1977 Energy Modeling Forum study and otherwise unpublished
parts of Volume 2, will be referred to as EMF, 1977. The papers contained
in Volume 2 which are published in more accessible form elsewhere, will
be referred to by author in this paper, and page numbers will refer to
the more accessible version, cited in the bibliography.
3

For example: "We all know that the higher cost of energy raises special
problems for every company and curbs overall growth prospects for Western
industrial nations. (Rule of thumb: Every 1% drop in energy supply
reduces.overall economic output by the same 1%.)" (Boardroom Reports,
Vol. 8, No. 7, April 15, 197g, p. 5, "Energy and Business: Specialist's
View.")

4

This rule of thumb is not very accurate for large changes in energy use,
but it does indicate the order of magnitude of the cost incurred for the
moderate levels of conservation proposed in most policy discussions. For
greater accuracy, use equation (14) .

.'>

The ranking of cost of the different energy sources is of course purely
illustrative.
6

Ihe cost of aggregate energy conservation in the Nordhaus model is comparable to the cost of conservation scenarios in the ETA model shown in
MRG (1978, Figures III-11 and III-12, pp. 107 and 109). Qualitatively
similar results were obtained for other models in EMF (1977, Volume 2,
Appendix D) .
7
The cost of inefficient conservation plans, or plans subject to additional
environmental or other constraints, might of course be much higher. The multi
sectoral models are indispensible for evaluation of different detailed conser
vation scenarios when additional sectoral constraints are important. An inter
esting comparison of an optimal conservation strategy derived by imposing
an aggregate energy constraint on the Nordhaus model with~ priori conservation
scenarios subject to additional constraints, is discussed in MRG (1978, p. 112).

8

A very similar statement appears in EMF (1Q77, p. 26). MRG (1Q78, p. 44)
shows the same line of thinking: "[WJe have estimated the effects of
policies that curtail energy supply below what it would otherwise have
been ••• fn]oes not the diminished F.~. use of energy also reduce GNP below
what it would have otherwise been? •••Virtually everyone will agree that
such a reverse effect exists. For our present purpose, however, the
real question is how large or small it is •••• "
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It is iron ical that the simu lation with fixed capi
tal and labor
perfo rmed by Hogan and Manne (1977, pp. 16R-272)
to deriv e cond ition s
unde r which "trad ition al demand curve analy sis" is
a
estim ating economic costs is itsel f actua lly a calcu valid method of
latio n of the exces s
burd en under the aarg inal produ ct curve , which is
appro ximat ed by the
welfa re trian gle of equa tion (13). The diffe renc
e in accur acy between
their calcu latio n and the area of the trian gle depen
ds solel y on the
accur acy of the linea r approximation_ to the deman
d curve over the range
of varia tion in energ y inpu t.
9 This early Huds
on-Jo rgens on mode l shoul d not be confu sed (as it
commonly
is) with the Long Term Inter -Indu stry Tran sacti ons
Model (LITM) which
they devel oped by in effec t repla cing the produ ction
modu le of their
macro econo mic grow th mode l with their inter -indu
stry mode l. This inte
grati on to form a full gene ral equil ibriu m model
is caref ully expla ined
in Hudson and Jorge nson (1977 , Secti on D, pp. 84-90
).
lOThe only input link descr ibed in Manne (1Q77) betwe
en the MACRO and
ETA mode ls is the flow of energ y costs repre sente
d by the varia ble
COSTEN (see Mann, 1977 , Figur e 1, p. 6, and p. 3Q).
COSTEN appa rentl y
inclu des both labor and capi tal servi ces.
11

For exam ple: "If energ y and capit al are subs tituta
ble, cete ris parib us,
then highe r price d energ y will incre ase the deman
d for new capi tal goods .
If energ y and capi tal are comp lemen ts, then cete
ris parib us, highe r price s of
energ y will dampen the demand for energ y and the
demand for new plant
and equip ment ." (Bern dt and Wood, 1975, p. 259)

1

2i--or illum inati ng discu ssion s of the inter preta tion
of Allen parti al
elas ticit ies of suhs tituti on unrle r const ant outpu
t
see
Bern dt and Wood
(1Q7Q) or Hogan (1Q77 ).
13
Cons ider, for exam ple, the unde rlyin g produ ction
funct ion

Y • H(N, E, L)
• G(N, E)lJ L l-lJ

wher e the weak ly separ able subfu nctio n G(N, E) has
a cons tant elast icity
of subs tituti on spec ifica tion. If Lis fixed at
Ln the relev ant produ ction
func tion can be writt en

a-1
y - F(~, E)• (aN a

where

a, b > 0 ,

0<o <o:: i,

~

+

bE

CJ-1

tl]
a

0<µ <l.

oµ < o-1,
1

FNE =

{v - l

+ ~}{µabGµ-

2

i{~}

0

< 0 •

Then:
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140 An assumption of a constant savings
rate would imply a complementary
relationship between capital and energy but a very weak one with little
aggregate effect on the equilibrium solution. This is inconsistent with
the argument above that the link between capital and energy may be
the most important component of energy scarcity. The most plausible ap
proximation, therefore, is a continuation of the assumption implicit
in the analysis of the individual firm, a perfectly elastic supply of
capitll at the equilibrium price of _capital" (Hogan, 1q77, p. 18).
15

rf a substantial domestic energy production sector were included in the
model, the effect of conservation on input use would of course also reflect
the response of this sector and its relative factor intensity. But the
qualitative welfare conclusions reported below would still stand.
16 ·This effect contrasts with
the conclusions of Sweeney (1Q7R) that
"In an efficient world, induced changes in labor or capital input do
not ch~nge welfare even though they do change NNP" (p. 36) and that in
such a world ''Whether energy is complementary or supplementary with
capital or labor is totally irrelevant" for welfare analysis of changes
in energy use (p. 37). Sweeney's analysis (see his "fundamental"
equation 7, p. 8) fails to recognize that, apart from rent transfers,
both the direct welfare effects of a change in energy use from an initially
undistorted situation, and the indirect effects through induced changes
in primary factor supplies, are second (and higher) order effects, as
shown in (23) above, and as confirmed by Sweeney's own numerical results
for conservation in an otherwise undistorted economy. (See Sweeney, 1Q78,
Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4).
17

.
Use of the compensating variation assumes that the benefits of conservation can be treated as a lump-sum "reward" of units of Y. (This
assumption is somewhat analogous to the common practice of calculating
a set of optimal taxes taking the revenue constraint as given.) A more
satisfactory approach to this question involves incorporating the reason
for conservation in the analysis, as outlined in footnote 17 below.

18 For a lucid discussion
see Feldstein (1(}76).

20
To avoid confusion,
t th
no e
at the net cost includes the value of the
energy saved.
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